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ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ORPHAN WORKS
Katherine Moran Meeks*
In recent decades, Congress has elongated the term of copyright
protection and eliminated the requirement that authors register and renew
their copyrights. These changes, aimed partly at bringing our copyright
system into line with Europe’s, have brought about significant collateral
damage. They have resulted in a large population of orphan works—that
is, works that remain under copyright protection but whose owners cannot
be found. The uncertain ownership status of these works has hampered
libraries, museums, and private companies from using them in ways that
might be beneficial to the public. This Article proposes that the doctrine of
adverse possession could be adapted to extinguish the copyright in these
orphan works and free them for use by the general public.

I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law does not discriminate between high and low art, or
even between art and workaday expression. It extends protection equally
to timeless symphonies and ephemeral pop ballads.1 While the commercial
lifespan of most copyrighted works is accordingly brief,2 some works retain
value through the generations.3 The authors and corporations that own

* Law clerk to Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The author thanks Professor Shyam Balganesh and Rory Schneider for their helpful
comments on prior drafts of this paper. She also thanks David Meeks for his love, support, and
patience. It is the author’s preference to use masculine singular pronouns.
1. This has been true at least since 1903, when the Supreme Court held that copyright
protection does not turn on a judge’s assessment of the quality of the expression. As Justice
Holmes famously admonished, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth” of literary and artistic creations.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
2. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly
about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain commercial value.”).
3. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that Gone With the Wind, published in 1936, remains “one of the best-selling books in the
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such commercially viable works have pressured Congress to broaden the
sweep of their intellectual property rights.4 Lawmakers have obliged by
repeatedly elongating the term of copyright protection in recent decades.5
At the same time, Congress has eliminated the requirement that authors
register and renew their copyrights,6 onetime administrative formalities that
were designed to maintain protection only for those works that had some
commercial or sentimental value to their owners.7
These changes, aimed at pieces with continuing viability, have
delivered less celebrated works into a purgatory of uncertain ownership.
Copyright protection persists for out-of-print books, historic photos, and
other cultural artifacts even when the owner has died, faded into obscurity,
or ceased to stake any claim to them.8 Yet the threat of an infringement
suit from some long-lost owner, however remote, has frustrated libraries,
museums, and private actors that are seeking to incorporate these so-called
orphan works9 into digital archives that have the potential to open new
avenues of scholarship and learning.
This Article proposes that Congress should adapt the real property
doctrine of adverse possession to clear the muddy rights to orphan works
and release them into the public domain. Adverse possession is a
mechanism for resolving competing claims to land that arise where an
owner has failed to assert his rights for many years, thereby allowing a
hostile trespasser to assume control of the land as if it were his own.10 If
world” and that the copyright holder recently granted permission for a second sequel); Ethan
Smith & Erica Orden, Mickey, Darth Vader to Join Forces, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2012, at B1
(describing the longevity of the Star Wars movies and announcing the sale of Lucasfilm, the
company that owns them).
4. See Charles Kenny, Mickey Mouse, Villain: How Copyrights for U.S. Cartoons Are
Holding the Developing World Hostage, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr. 2011, at 29 (noting that
Disney “spent more than $5 million in 2009” to lobby the federal government on intellectual
property issues).
5. See General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541,
2572 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976)).
6. See id. (renewal); id. § 408(a) (registration).
7. Olive Huang, Note, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes for
the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 269 (2006).
8. See id. at 267–68.
9. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (defining orphan
works as “older and more obscure works with minimal commercial value that have copyright
owners who are difficult or impossible to track down”).
10. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1984).
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the adverse possessor can satisfy each element of a common law test,11 a
court will strip the original owner of his title and vest it in the trespasser.12
The doctrine carries an odor of unfairness, but several compelling
policies justify its harsh consequences for the original owner. Adverse
possession removes stale claims to land,13 improving its value in the
marketplace. It expresses the law’s preference for productive use of
resources over passive neglect.14 Additionally, it encourages owners to be
watchful custodians of their property and to take at least minimal care to
prevent it from becoming a nuisance.15 Although Congress would need to
modify the common law test before it could be applied to intangible
property, the policy rationale behind adverse possession applies with equal
or greater force in the orphan works context. When copyright holders fail
both to exploit their products and to register their whereabouts with the
Copyright Office, their intellectual property rights should be expunged so
as not to shackle libraries, museums, or other institutions that perceive a
scholarly or commercial demand for the work.16
A handful of courts have already embraced the application of adverse
possession to copyright, if only for a limited purpose.17 They have used the
doctrine to repel claims by putative heirs or joint owners who surface after
years of silence, threatening to disrupt another’s longstanding and
profitable use of a copyrighted work. In Gee v. CBS, Inc., for example, a
federal district court held that a record company’s open and notorious sale
of a sound recording by the blues singer Bessie Smith operated, over a
period of years, to extinguish any right that her adopted son had to the
work.18 This Article envisions a broader role for the doctrine of adverse
11. Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 434 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (“In order to establish a
claim of adverse possession, the possession must be: (1) exclusive, (2) actual and uninterrupted,
(3) open and notorious and (4) hostile and under a claim of right made in good faith.”).
12. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 1127.
13. See id. at 1128.
14. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 860 (3rd
ed. 2000).
15. Merrill, supra note 10, at 1130.
16. Cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985)
(“[C]opyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.”).
17. E.g., Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp.
600 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
18. Gee, 471 F. Supp. at 657 (concluding that, under state copyright law, the record
company’s “arguably wrongful possession of exclusive rights to ‘At the Christmas Ball’ ripened
into complete and perfect ownership, good against Bessie Smith’s estate”).
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possession than previously recognized by the courts. At present, no
mechanism exists for expunging the intellectual property rights of authors
who, by all appearances, have abandoned their copyrighted works.19 When
these rights no longer benefit the author,20 they should not paralyze others
who have identified a new use for the work. Adverse possession could
remove the threat of infringement liability and help resurrect books,
photographs, and other forms of creative expression that have fallen out of
circulation, thereby enriching the store of human knowledge.
This proposal would help counteract the seemingly inexorable
expansion of intellectual property rights.21 The Constitution empowers
Congress to grant copyright protection in order to promote the
dissemination of knowledge,22 but the repeated extensions of the copyright
term have sometimes impeded the use of older or lesser-known works
whose authors cannot easily be found. In 2001, for example, the library at
Carnegie Mellon University considered whether to make digital copies of
the books in its collection, a project that would require the permission of
copyright holders except where needed to preserve a particularly brittle
copy of a book.23 The university excluded nearly a quarter of its books
from the digital archive after it failed to identify the copyright holders.24
Just as it does in the real property context, adverse possession could lift the
cloud of uncertainty regarding ownership of these works. As envisioned in
this Article, the doctrine would immunize an institution such as Carnegie
Mellon from liability for copying, displaying, or distributing copyrighted
works. Furthermore, after a period of years, the adverse use of a book,
photograph, or other creative expression would destroy the owner’s
19. See Huang, supra note 7, at 268.
20. To avoid orphaning his work, an author does not have to publish or commercially
exploit it. Indeed, many copyrighted works have purely sentimental value. The author simply
has to give an outward signal that the work is owned and exercise his right to exclude. See
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
21. See Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song, 56 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 335, 340 (2009) (noting that copyright law historically did not need a
version of adverse possession, “arguably because the limited term of copyright protection itself
served the function of clearing title and balancing the interests of the inattentive owner and the
productive user,” but suggesting that one might be warranted now).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23. Letter from Denise Troll Covey, Principal Librarian for Special Projects at Carnegie
Mellon Univ., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Registrar for Policy & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office
(Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-Carnegie
Mellon.pdf.
24. Id.

06. MEEKS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/15/2013 2:01 PM

ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ORPHAN WORKS

5

entitlement and deposit the work into the public domain, the intellectual
commons from which future authors, scholars, and publishers may borrow
without fear of detonating an infringement suit.25 Adverse possession
would thus help to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
where copyright itself has failed to serve that constitutional end.26
Parts II and III of this Article describe the genesis of the orphan
works problem and detail specific instances where it has impeded efforts by
libraries, publishers, and search engines to make such works available to
the public. Parts IV and V propose that the doctrine of adverse possession
could be extrapolated from its roots in real property law to provide a
solution to the orphan works problem. Congress would need to retool the
doctrine before it could be introduced into the copyright law, but public
policy would provide the necessary guidance. Finally, this paper argues
that adverse possession will help restore balance to a copyright system that
has aggrandized the rights of authors at the expense of the public. By
repeatedly lengthening the term of copyright protection, Congress has
impoverished the public domain, that repository of works free from private
ownership that other artists can tap for inspiration. This Article argues, as
others have before, that the public domain is not a boneyard of works no
longer subject to copyright protection, but rather an affirmative concept
that deserves consideration in any proposal to expand private rights.27
II. THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM
Starting in 1976, Congress introduced several changes to the
copyright law that have given rise to the orphan works problem. Authors
historically obtained copyright protection for only a brief period of years,
with the option to renew the copyright if it remained valuable at the end of
that term.28 When Congress passed the first copyright statute in 1790, for
25. See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, where a
“work is in the public domain, the publisher could publish it without the author’s permission”);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2066 (2012) (“Other
resources are declared to be open to all as a matter of policy, such as . . . copyrights that have
expired and returned to the public domain.”).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the
Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 86–87 (2003) (pushing for an
“affirmative discourse” about the importance of the public domain that might serve as a
counterweight to the property rights rhetoric that fuels the continued expansion of the
copyright term).
28. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
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example, it granted protection for fourteen years plus a fourteen-year
renewal term.29 By 1909, it had elongated that term to twenty-eight years
with the option to renew for twenty-eight more.30 During its housecleaning
of the copyright statute in 1976, however, Congress embarked on a
fundamental change, abandoning the fixed term with a renewal option and
establishing a period of protection lasting for the life of the author plus fifty
years.31
The legislative history reflects several reasons for the seismic shift.
First, lawmakers jettisoned the renewal system to save authors the
“substantial burden and expense” that this “highly technical” process
imposed.32 They replaced it with a term of protection tied to the author’s
life to ensure that the books, music, or artwork that he labored to produce
could sustain him through old age and generate returns for his heirs after
his death.33 Lawmakers felt that tying the term of protection to the life of
the author was especially important as advances in technology seemed
poised to extend the commercial life of many artistic works, potentially by
many decades.34 Finally, and most importantly, Congress felt a “pressing”
need to bring this country’s copyright term into conformity with that of
many European countries, which typically extended copyright protection
for the life of the author plus fifty years.35 At the time, many of those
countries expressed resentment that American works enjoyed a longer term

29. Id.
30. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81.
31. General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541,
2572 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976)).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 302(5), at 134 (1976).
33. Id. § 302(1). The House Report argued that extending the term of protection would
produce a benefit to authors without harming the public, which “frequently pays the same for
works in the public domain as it does for copyrighted works.” Id. § 302(3). This claim beggars
belief. Copyright gives an author monopoly control over his work, which in turn allows him to
extract a higher price than he could in a perfectly competitive market, or in a market where the
work is free for all to use. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 126 (2002). Recent history provides
an example. In 1994, as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress extended
copyright protection to certain works by foreign authors that had previously been in the public
domain. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976
(1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)). Once the work came under copyright protection,
the price that orchestras paid for a Shostakovich score rose “by a multiple of seven.” Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 904 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 302(2), at 134.
35. Id. § 302(7), at 135.
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of protection in Europe than European works enjoyed in the United
States.36 Congress believed that an internationally uniform copyright term
would smooth relations with trading partners and “provide certainty and
simplicity in international business dealings.”37
Even if Congress’s decision to fashion our copyright term in Europe’s
image made sense from a diplomatic perspective, it ignored the divergent
legal and philosophical traditions that underpin the two copyright systems.
Copyright protection in Europe is tethered to the life of the author because
it is viewed as a natural right flowing from the author’s deep personal
connection to his creative expression—a concept often referred to as moral
rights.38 By contrast, copyright protection in the United States has
historically lasted for a shorter, fixed term because it is viewed as an
instrumental benefit given to authors to incentivize their production of
creative expression for the ultimate benefit of the public.39 By aligning the
copyright term at home with that in Europe, Congress effectively
superimposed a moral rights framework onto the copyright statute while
neglecting the countervailing interest in a robust public domain.
In 1998, Congress extended the length of protection to the life of the
author plus seventy years, again to keep pace with prevailing international
practice.40 As of 1993, the European Union’s member states had granted
copyright protection for the life of the author plus seventy years—except
that foreign works received only the amount of protection they had in their
country of origin.41 Media and entertainment firms successfully argued
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 306 (1996) (“There are many reasons for copyright’s expansion, including
technological development, power politics (both domestic and international), and the
transformation of the United States from a net importer to a major exporter of intellectual works.”).
38. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330
(1988) (delineating the “personality theory” underlying European copyright, under which an
owner has a property right in his creative work because it “is a manifestation of the creator’s
personality or self”).
39. See Golan, 131 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “economic
philosophy” embedded in the Copyright Clause envisions that “limited monopoly privileges . . .
are conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation”); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and
Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 450–52 (2007) (outlining the nineteenthcentury debate in the United States between those who viewed copyright as a “fundamental,
natural, even ‘God-given’” right and those who saw it as a “utilitarian construct,” and noting that
the Supreme Court decisively came down on the side of the latter).
40. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b),
112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)).
41. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 4–5 (1996).
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that they were forfeiting revenue opportunities abroad42 because the lifeplus-fifty rubric was still in place in the United States.43 Meanwhile, some
companies had more particular reasons for urging Congress to fortify their
intellectual property rights both at home and abroad. Disney would have
watched one of the world’s most valuable copyrights, Mickey Mouse, pass
into the public domain if Congress had not extended the term of protection
in 1998.44
These changes may have buoyed the media and entertainment sector,
but they also came at a distinct cost. Now that authors no longer have to
renew their copyrights, protection persists even for works that have little
commercial or sentimental value for their creators.45 To illustrate, in 1973,
just three years before the copyright statute’s overhaul, only fifteen percent
of authors elected to renew their copyright after the initial term of twentyeight years had expired.46 Furthermore, recent studies suggest that “only
about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain commercial

42. See, e.g., Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 53 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President
and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America) (arguing that, without a copyright term
extension, “American works would go into the public domain in Europe” earlier than European
works would, “thereby cutting off revenues for American copyright owners, and transferring
those revenues into European hands”).
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (claiming that the extension would “ensure
that profits generated from the sale of U.S. intellectual property abroad will come back to the
United States”); 143 CONG. REC. 4573 (1997) (quoting Orrin Hatch, the Senator who introduced
the Copyright Term Extension Act, as arguing that the legislation would allow “American
copyright owners to benefit to the fullest extent from foreign uses”).
44. See Robert Darnton, Google and the Future of Books, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 12,
2009, at 9 (lampooning the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 as the “Mickey
Mouse Protection Act”).
45. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 124 (“By degrees, the copyright law has flipped over
from a system that protected only rights that were claimed to one that vests all rights, whether
claimed or not.”); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 157 (1981) (describing the scope of the 1976 Copyright Act as “ludicrous,” and observing
that it extends protection to such ephemera as “notes to babysitters, instructions to chimney
sweeps, directions to my house”).
46. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 135 (2004); see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 473
(2003) (noting that “fewer than 11 percent of the copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964
were renewed at the end of their twenty-eight-year term”).
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value.”47 Renewal used to segregate works that had value to their author
from those that did not, freeing the remainder to enter the public domain.48
Without that mechanism, copyright protection persists for a wide array of
works, whether or not the author cares to have the exclusive right to them.49
When an author cannot be located, expansive intellectual property rights
have impeded libraries, museums, and private companies from making
digital copies of this material and posting it to online databases where it
might receive newfound attention from scholars.50 As Professor Lawrence
Lessig put it:
Forget Mickey Mouse. . . . Forget all the works from the 1920s
and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The real
harm of term extension comes not from these famous works.
The real harm is to the works that are not famous, not
commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.51
In spite of this collateral damage, Congress is unlikely to revive the
renewal system. Lawmakers recognized even as they were amending the
statute in 1976 that they were extending protection even for works that had
“practically no value to anyone” except scholars and specialists.52 They
nonetheless concluded that the benefits of eliminating renewal, particularly
bringing the United States into conformity with international copyright
norms, outweighed the disadvantages.53
Even as Congress eliminated renewal and elongated the term of

47. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing EDWARD
RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-144 E, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING
THE ECONOMIC VALUES (1998)).
48. See Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 2007).
49. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A
Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 314 (2010) (“Protection thus ‘subsists’
even for casual communications, and even though the author may not be a professional creator,
and hence may be unaware of or indifferent to any copyright in her work.”).
50. See Comments of the Library of Congress in Response to the Copyright Office Notice
of Inquiry Regarding Orphan Works 3 (Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Comments Regarding Orphan
Works], available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0630-LOC.pdf.
51. LESSIG, supra note 46, at 221.
52. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 302(7), at 136 (1976).
53. See id. (“It is true that today’s ephemera represent tomorrow’s social history, and that
works of scholarly value, which [now fall] into the public domain after 28 years, would be
protected much longer under the bill. Balanced against this are the burdens and expenses of
renewals . . . and the extremely strong case in favor of a life-plus-50 system.”).
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protection, it made another pivotal change that has beached thousands,
perhaps millions, of creative works in a wilderness of uncertain ownership.
Authors traditionally had to satisfy three threshold requirements before
they could obtain copyright protection: (1) affix a copyright notice to the
work, (2) register it with the U.S. Copyright Office, and (3) deposit two
copies with the Library of Congress.54 By putting authors through these
paces, the law ensured that copyright would attach only where the creator
believed it would produce economic returns.55 More likely than not, the
bureaucratic hassle would dissuade authors from seeking protection for
works with only limited or ephemeral value.56 In 1976 and 1989, however,
the United States discarded these “formalities” in order to join the Berne
Convention, the international copyright treaty that forbids governments
from subjecting authors to a bureaucratic steeplechase before they can
obtain intellectual property protection.57 Today, copyright materializes the
moment an author “fixes,” or records, his work in a “tangible medium of
expression.”58 Nothing more is required. The demise of formalities, like
the demise of renewal, means that copyright attaches “indiscriminately” to
works that have value and those that do not.59 It also means that copyright

54. These formalities date to the first copyright statute, passed in 1790, when authors had
to deposit their work with the Secretary of State rather than the Library of Congress. See
Copyright Act of 1790, ch.15, §§ 1, 3, 4, 1 Stat. 124, 124–25; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 663–67 (1834); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect
Enforcement of Property Rights, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1927, 1942 (2012) (noting that, under the
1909 act, “[i]f an author published her work without attaching a proper notice of copyright
ownership, the law would treat her publication as a ‘dedication to the public’ that stripped away
all legal protection for her copyright”).
55. See Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 313.
56. See id. (“These formalities thus . . . have divided works of perceived economic
significance worth the effort of compliance from the mass of other creations, leaving the latter
free for others to exploit.”).
57. General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 408(a), 90 Stat. 2541,
2580 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.); see also Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2) (providing that the
“enjoyment and the exercise” of intellectual property rights “shall not be subject to any
formality”); BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33392, “ORPHAN WORKS” IN
COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (2008) (noting that Congress discarded formalities partly to lift the “undue
burden” they imposed on authors, but primarily to “harmonize U.S. copyright law with
international treaties and practice”).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
59. Lawrence Lessig, Little Orphan Artworks, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008, at A23.
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holders have become more difficult to identify.60 Even after Congress
eliminated the formalities, many authors continued to attach the copyright
notice to their works and register them with the Copyright Office
precisely so that parties seeking to use or license the work might contact
them.61 Nonetheless, many works bear no trace of their owner. These are
the orphans, and libraries, corporations, and individuals use them at peril
of litigation.62
The uncertainty surrounding orphan works has handicapped libraries
and museums in their efforts to post collections online. In 2001, the
Library of Congress sought to display on its public web site letters, news
clippings, and other papers kept by the author and political philosopher
Hannah Arendt.63 Of the approximately 25,000 items in the collection, the
library selected 7000 pieces for permissions research, of which it
eventually displayed 5000.64 The library declined to post the remaining
works because it could not identify the copyright owners.65 Similarly,
Cornell University discovered that roughly half of its collection of
agricultural monographs were orphans.66
The Holocaust Memorial
Museum in Washington, D.C., declined to publish thousands of historical
documents online because it could not locate the copyright holders.67 The
Los Angeles Public Library has withheld its collection of Mexican folk
music from the public for the same reason.68 Meanwhile, Duke University
60. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 22 (2006) (summarizing
four reasons why it is often difficult for libraries and other potential users to locate the owner of a
copyrighted work: (1) copies do not contain adequate information identifying the copyright
holder; (2) changes in ownership or changes in the circumstances of the owner have made it
difficult to identify or locate the owner; (3) information in copyright registries is limited; and (4)
research into a work’s provenance is time-consuming and expensive).
61. Authors have another powerful incentive to register their works: registration is
necessary to bring an infringement suit, if not to obtain copyright protection in the first instance.
17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006). Authors must also register their work before they can obtain statutory
damages or attorney’s fees arising out of the suit. Id. § 412.
62. See Lewis Hyde, Advantage Google, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at BR27.
63. Comments Regarding Orphan Works, supra note 50, at 6.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Hyde, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 905 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting other examples and citing a
study estimating that thirteen million books and 225,000 films under copyright in Europe are
orphans).
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failed to unearth the copyright owners for more than half of its collection of
7000 advertisements published between 1911 and 1955.69 These, like
thousands of other orphaned historical documents, remain accessible to
scholars only in hard copy in university libraries.
These libraries and museums might seem, at first blush, to have a
compelling fair use claim to these works.70 They are building digital
archives in order to advance scholarship and learning, not to earn a profit, a
factor that tends to weigh heavily in a court’s fair use analysis.71 But the
copyright statute contains a specific provision that governs library
archiving.72 It allows libraries to make digital copies only when printed
volumes are “damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen,” and replacement
copies cannot be bought for a reasonable price.73 Moreover, the digital
copies may be displayed only in the physical confines of the library, not on
a public web site.74 This narrow provision would seem to foreclose
libraries from invoking the more general fair use defense in support of
ambitious efforts to make entire collections available on the web.75 In
addition, the fair use defense would not immunize individuals or
corporations that have identified a commercial, rather than a scholarly or
nonprofit, use for orphan works.76 The essayist Lewis Hyde has noted that
publishing houses, as much as libraries, have hesitated to distribute works
of historical or scholarly interest because of their murky copyright status:
Orphan works are all those Brats whose copyrights are still
69. Huang, supra note 7, at 268.
70. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985)
(defining fair use as “a privilege in others than the owner . . . to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent,” and noting the four-factor test for evaluating whether
borrowing is fair); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (prescribing the elements of the four-factor
test, namely (1) “the purpose and character of the use,” (2) “the nature of the copyrighted work,”
(3) “the amount and substantiality” of what is borrowed, and (4) “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”).
71. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“The first factor
in a fair use enquiry is ‘the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)
(2006))).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
73. Id. § 108(c).
74. Id. § 108(c)(2).
75. Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 965 n.62 (2012).
76. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
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active but whose parents cannot be found. There are millions of
them out there, and they are gumming up the world of
publishing. Suppose a publisher wants to print an anthology of
1930s magazine fiction. Copyright now lasts so long (a century
in many cases) that the publisher must assume that there are
rights holders for all those stories. Suppose that half the owners
can’t be found. What should the publisher do? Its lawyers will
advise abandoning the anthology: statutory damages for
copyright infringement now stand between $750 and $150,000
per instance.77
Of course, one company more than any other has run aground on the
rocky shoals of the orphan works problem.
III. THE GOOGLE BOOK PROJECT
In 2002, Google began a Promethean effort to digitize every book
ever published.78 The company’s founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin,
were graduate students at Stanford when a flood destroyed thousands of the
university’s books in 1998, and the episode impressed on them the need to
preserve books in a form less prone to devastation and decay.79 From
Google’s early days as a startup company, Page and Brin envisioned an
online library that would “unlock the wisdom” stored in rare and out-ofprint books that “are not accessible to anyone except the most tenacious
researchers at premier academic libraries.”80 Natural disasters aside, they
wanted to save books from the harsh reality of the print market, in which
publishers shunt yesterday’s books aside to make way for the latest
bestseller.81 As Brin described in an essay in the New York Times:
Books written after 1923 quickly disappear into a literary black
hole. With rare exceptions, one can buy them only for the
small number of years they are in print. After that, they are
found in only a vanishing number of libraries and used book

77. Hyde, supra note 62.
78. See Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 30, 30
(explaining Google’s ambitious plans to “scan every book ever published,” and recounting the
history of the project from inception to present).
79. Sergey Brin, Op-Ed., A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A31.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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stores. As the years pass, contracts get lost and forgotten,
authors and publishers disappear, the rights holders become
impossible to track down.82
Of course, Google also hoped to reap a profit from the book project.83
Its searchable online database includes twelve million volumes and
counting,84 many of them out of print, and Google has explored whether it
might sell subscriptions to universities interested either in its powerful
search function or in the access it would afford to rare books previously
available at only a handful of major research libraries.85 Google has
already introduced several search tools, currently available for free, that
might prove especially tantalizing to scholars. One of these allows
linguists to trace the origin of words and their frequency of use over time
by tapping “books published between 1500 and 2008 in English, French,
Spanish, German, Chinese and Russian.”86
Although its library project could revolutionize access to books,
Google has stirred outrage among authors and publishers with its cavalier
approach to copyright.87 Google did not build its online archive solely with
books in the public domain, but instead took the audacious step of scanning
copyrighted books without seeking the permission of copyright holders.88
82. Id.
83. See Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1320–21 (2010) (describing ways in which Google intends to monetize
its book project, including by selling institutional subscriptions and tailoring ads to consumers
who search the book database); Eric Pfanner, Google Has Deal in France for Book-Scanning
Project, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2012, at B5 (describing a settlement between French publishers
and Google that will allow the latter to scan and sell digital copies of out-of-print books).
84. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
85. Id. at 671.
86. Patricia Cohen, In 500 Billion Words, A New Window on Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2010, at A3. To use this feature, visit Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.
google.com/ngrams (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
87. See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 681–82 (cataloguing negative responses to
Google’s book scanning project); Emily Anne Proskine, Note, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat:
A Copyright Analysis of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213,
219 (2006) (observing that Google’s strategy of requiring authors to opt out of having their books
included in the digital library was “anathema” to many in the publishing industry). But see
Samuelson, supra note 83, at 1314–15 (quoting Robert Darnton, the Harvard librarian, as saying
the book project elicits both “utopian enthusiasm” and “jeremiads about the danger of
concentrating power to control access to information”).
88. See Michael Hiltzik, Op-Ed., Building a Digital Public Library Without Google’s
Money, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at B1 (describing Google’s “strategy of scanning books first
and worrying about copyrights later”).
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The company asserts that its library project amounts to fair use because it
does not make the full text of copyrighted books available through its
search engine.89 Instead, when a user punches in a search for a recent
bestseller, Google displays only a brief excerpt, or “snippet,” that might
entice the user to buy a legitimate copy of the book.90 This claim is at least
plausible. In recent years, the courts of appeals have allowed search
engines to display “thumbnail” images and other imperfect or partial copies
of protected works where they help connect users with information.91 The
fact that many of the books Google has copied are out of print, and are
therefore producing little or no revenue for copyright holders, also tends to
bolster its fair use defense.92
Nonetheless, a coalition of authors and publishers sued in 2005,
seeking damages as well as removal of their books from Google’s online
database.93 The parties reached a settlement in 2009, agreeing that Google
could continue to make electronic copies, sell online access to individual
books, and hawk subscriptions to its database in exchange for sharing
revenue with authors and publishers.94 In effect, the parties engineered a
“forward-looking” business deal that allowed Google to build a
comprehensive online library without fear of copyright liability.95 The
settlement gave Google broad immunity from future lawsuits because of
the sheer size of the plaintiff class.96 With the exception of 6800 authors
and publishers who opted out of the agreement, the class included every
person who holds a copyright in a book or insert published in the United
States, including the owners of orphan works.97 Scholars, interest groups,
89. Toobin, supra note 78, at 33.
90. Id. at 32–33.
91. E.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
92. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(“Although going out of print does not terminate a copyright, it is an appropriate element to consider
[in conducting the fair use analysis].”), aff’d, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627–28 (1982) (arguing that distribution of out-of-print
works may justify a fair use defense, “since markets cannot form where goods are unavailable”).
93. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
94. Id. at 671.
95. Id. at 677.
96. Id. at 682 (quoting a lawyer for the Internet Archive as arguing that the settlement
would give Google “a right, which no one else in the world would have, . . . to digitize works
with impunity, without any risk of statutory liability, for something like 150 years”).
97. Id. at 676.
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and the U.S. Department of Justice swiftly objected to the breadth of the
settlement.98 The Justice Department argued that the parties had used the
class action mechanism to effect a dramatic restructuring of intellectual
property rights, a job that properly belonged to Congress.99 The
government was particularly troubled that the settlement would give
Google a “de facto monopoly” over orphan works.100 Google would pocket
a portion of the revenue it earned from the sale of orphan works, depositing
the remainder into a registry that would safeguard the money in case
copyright holders resurfaced within ten years, after which the unclaimed
funds would be distributed to literary charities.101 Even as Google profited
from these unclaimed books, none of its competitors, including Microsoft,
Amazon, and Yahoo!, could enter the market for orphan works, at least
without risking a lawsuit.102
In the face of these pointed objections, the federal district court
rejected the settlement in March 2011.103 Judge Denny Chin acknowledged
that the agreement would help resurrect millions of orphan works,104 but he
admonished that thorny questions about rights in unclaimed books should
be answered by Congress, not the courts: “The questions of who should be

98. See id. at 673 (noting that the court received more than five hundred comments on the
proposed settlement, the “vast majority” of which were negative).
99. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Amended Settlement Agreement at 3, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-8136 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Statement of Interest] (“The Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘Rule 23
. . . cannot carry the large load’ of restructuring legal regimes in the absence of congressional
action—however sensible that restructuring might be.”).
100. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682; see also Samuelson, supra note 83, at 1358
(“Use of a class action settlement to restructure markets and to reallocate intellectual property
rights, particularly when it would give one firm a de facto monopoly to commercialize millions of
books, is arguably corrosive of fundamental tenets of our democratic society.”). But see Recent
Cases: Southern District of New York Rejects Proposed Google Books Settlement Agreement,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1279–80 (2012) (arguing that concerns about the “anticompetitive
impact” of the settlement are “overstated,” because antitrust doctrines such as the competitive
duty to deal might require Google to license orphan works to competitors at reasonable prices).
101. Amended Settlement Agreement § 6.3, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 058136 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009).
102. See Statement of Interest, supra note 99, at 21 (“The suggestion that a competitor
should follow Google’s lead by copying books en masse without permission in the hope of
prompting a class action suit to be settled on terms comparable to the [amended settlement
agreement] is poor public policy and not something the antitrust laws require a competitor to
do.”).
103. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
104. Id. at 678–79.
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entrusted with guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with
what safeguards are matters more appropriately decided by Congress than
through an agreement among private, self-interested parties.”105 The court
urged the parties to return to the negotiating table and consider limiting the
plaintiff class only to authors and publishers who affirmatively opted into
the settlement.106 Although this arrangement would cure many of Judge
Chin’s objections to the agreement,107 it would not allow Google to include
orphan books in its digital library, because the authors of such works are,
by definition, unavailable to consent. For now, orphan books remain
untouchable by Google or any other publisher, prisoners of extravagant
intellectual property protection.108
Congress must resolve the problem.109 In 2006, at the direction of
Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, the Copyright Office
recommended a reasoned solution that took pains to preserve the rights of
absent authors.110 If after a reasonably diligent search a party fails to find
the owner of a copyrighted work, the Copyright Office would allow him to
use that work without permission on the condition that he pay a licensing
fee if the author eventually surfaces.111 In essence, the proposal would
liberate parties to use orphaned works by capping potential damages. In
2006 and 2008, lawmakers considered but never passed several bills that
105. Id. at 677.
106. Id. at 686.
107. See id.
108. After Judge Chin rejected the proposed settlement, the Authors Guild and several
individual plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in federal district court in October 2011. Fourth
Amended Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05-8136 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 14, 2011). The Authors Guild sued as a class on behalf of all United States residents who
hold a copyright in at least one book that was registered with the Copyright Office within three
months of its first publication. Id. at 7. This registration requirement would seem to exclude
many orphan works from the proposed class. Google filed a motion to dismiss against the
Authors Guild, arguing that the association does not have standing to raise copyright infringement
claims on behalf of its members. The district court denied the motion and certified the proposed
class. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Second
Circuit stayed proceedings in the district court so that Google could appeal the class certification.
See Order Granting Motion to Stay the Proceedings, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 123200 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2012). Meanwhile, Google announced a settlement with the publishers,
but not with the authors. See Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Google, Publishers Settle Dispute, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 5, 2012, at B5.
109. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (labeling the orphan works problem
as fitting for legislative rather than judicial resolution).
110. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 60, at 1.
111. Id. at 12–13.
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would have implemented the office’s proposal.112
With the collapse of the Google settlement, Congress has a fresh
opportunity to confront the orphan works problem. This Article proposes
that lawmakers should embrace, up to a limit, the Copyright Office’s
proposal to fix damages for the use of such works. If a party exploits
orphaned expression and the true owner resurfaces within a period of years
determined by statute, Congress should require the former to pay the owner
a reasonable license fee and perhaps desist from using the work altogether.
Its resolution of the problem should not end there, however. If the owner
fails to appear after that period of years has expired, the other party’s open
and notorious use of the work should serve to extinguish the copyright and
place the work in the public domain.
This mechanism for stripping intellectual property rights from a
delinquent owner resembles the real property doctrine of adverse
possession.113
Although adverse possession could impose harsh
consequences on copyright holders, sound public policy favors divesting
them of their entitlement where they have neglected the property for a
significant amount of time.114 This policy justification carries perhaps
greater force with copyright than it does with real property. Expansive
intellectual property rights have handcuffed libraries, museums, and private
actors such as Google from resurrecting books and other expressive works,
even when the copyright owner no longer has any use for them.115 By
importing adverse possession into the copyright statute, Congress could
manumit these works into the public domain and thereby serve the
constitutional purpose of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”116

112. See YEH, supra note 57, at 9–16 (providing a summary of the bills).
113. See Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135–
36 (1918).
114. See id. at 136.
115. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1563–64 (1993)
(arguing that “creators should have property in their original works, only provided that such grant
of property does no harm to other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the
preexisting cultural matrix and scientific heritage”).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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IV. POLICIES JUSTIFYING APPLICATION OF ADVERSE POSSESSION TO
COPYRIGHT
A property right denotes the right to exclude others from land or
possessions.117 To some extent it also implies a duty to exclude,118 as
reflected in the doctrine of adverse possession. Adverse possession inflicts
a penalty on owners who have failed to monitor, maintain, or exclude
others from their property, thereby allowing a hostile trespasser to occupy
the land as if it were his own.119 If the trespasser satisfies the elements of a
common law test, a court will strip the original owner of title and create
new title in the trespasser.120 The trespasser’s possession of the land must
be “(1) exclusive, (2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) open and notorious, and
(4) hostile under a claim of right.”121 The trespasser meets this test by
asserting “visible . . . acts of ownership”122 over the property, perhaps by
building a fence, clearing brush, or erecting a building.123 Through these
acts of dominion, the trespasser not only telegraphs to the rest of the world
that he is the rightful occupant of the property, but also serves notice on the
original owner that he is ousting him from the land.124 If the true owner
nonetheless fails to bring an action in ejectment before the statute of
limitations expires,125 then the true owner loses his right to the property.126
117. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 1569, 1576 (2009) (defining a property right as “a set of exclusive use privileges
protected by an exclusionary right”).
118. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 808–09 (2d ed. 1993).
119. See id. at 814.
120. See id. at 807–08.
121. Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 434 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
122. Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 52 (1837).
123. See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816, 826 (1994) (observing that the doctrine requires the would-be adverse
possessor to “either reside on the land, install improvements such as fences and outbuildings or
cultivate part of the land continuously during the statutory period” as a way of asserting a “visible
challenge” to the original owner’s rights).
124. See In re Estate of Duran, 66 P.3d 326, 330 (N.M. 2003) (“In the typical adverse
possession case . . . the length and quality of the possession serve as notice.”).
125. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
198 (2007) (noting that the statute of limitations for actions in ejectment varies by state, running
“from a low of five to a high of forty years”).
126. The original owner loses not only his remedy, but also forfeits his right to the land.
Dean Ames quoted Lord Mansfield for this proposition: “‘Twenty years’ adverse possession is a
positive title to the defendant; it is not a bar to the action or remedy of the plaintiff only, but takes
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In essence, the trespasser acquires title to the property through a sequence
of two steps. First, he establishes good title against all but the true owner
through exclusive possession.127 Second, that possession ripens into good
title when the statute of limitations runs and the original owner can no
longer invoke the power of the courts to remove the trespasser from the
land.128 Notably, adverse possession does not effect a transfer of title from
the original owner to the trespasser.129 Instead, it extinguishes the former’s
title and vests original title with the latter, who has the strongest claim to
the property by virtue of his long possession.130 As Professor William
Walsh explains, “There is, of course, no transfer by operation of law or
otherwise of the former owner’s title. A new title has arisen simply and
solely because of the wrongful possession followed by the statutory
extinguishment of the former title.”131
Adverse possession is bitter medicine for the original owner. Not
only does the doctrine dissolve his title to the property, but it does not
require the adverse possessor to pay for the land.132 As Professor Henry
Ballantine explained:
Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft
or robbery, a primitive method of acquiring land without paying
for it. When the novice is told that by the weight of authority not
away his right of possession.’” J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 313, 319
(1890); see also HENRY F. BUSWELL, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
§ 229, at 313 (1889) (“But by the Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, § 34, it was provided that ‘at the
end of the time limited . . . the right and title to the land shall be extinguished.’”).
127. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J.
2419, 2422 (2001) (explaining that, while an adverse possessor’s rights are “inferior” to the real
owner’s before the statute of limitations has run, her rights “are superior to any stranger’s by
virtue of her prior possession”); cf. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 439 B.R. 811, 816
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting the “old aphorism that possession is nine-tenths of the law”).
128. See Kipka v. Fountain, 499 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (“At the root of
claims of title by adverse possession . . . is the statute of limitations on actions to recover
possession of land.”).
129. 1 WILLIAM F. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 122–23
(1947).
130. Id.
131. Id.; see also STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 853 (noting that “adverse
possession provides a rare instance in which original title may arise in a mature society”).
132. Cf. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 586 (Cal. 1984)
(overturning an intermediate appellate court holding that an adverse user had to compensate the
original owner to obtain a prescriptive easement, the doctrinal cousin of title acquired through
adverse possession).
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even good faith is a requisite, the doctrine apparently affords an
anomalous instance of maturing a wrong into a right contrary to
one of the most fundamental axioms of law.133
The law justifies these harsh results on policy grounds. First, adverse
possession quiets title where two or more people have asserted competing
claims to land.134 By erasing stale claims and clarifying ownership, the
doctrine enhances the market value of land and enables its sale, transfer, or
mortgage.135 Without such a mechanism, potential purchasers of land
could face excessive information costs researching the chain of title and
negotiating with multiple owners who might be tempted to extract holdout
prices.136 Relatedly, the doctrine vindicates the reliance interests of
creditors, tenants, and others who entered into business arrangements with
the adverse possessor under the belief that he was the true owner of the
land.137 Third, adverse possession serves as a background threat that
should spur owners to be diligent stewards of their property.138 While the
law does not require owners to keep day-to-day watch over their land, it
penalizes those who fail to take even minimal steps to monitor their
property.139 It bears emphasizing that owners do not have to develop or
actively use their land in order to protect themselves from a claim of
adverse possession; they merely have to take periodic notice of the property
and exercise their right to eject hostile trespassers.140 Still, it is often said
that adverse possession expresses the law’s preference for productive use

133. Ballantine, supra note 113, at 135.
134. See id. (asserting that quieting title is the preeminent purpose of the doctrine); see
also Chaplin, 676 P.2d at 435 (“The doctrine of adverse possession was formulated at law for the
purpose of, among others, assuring maximum utilization of land, encouraging the rejection of
stale claims and, most importantly, quieting titles.”).
135. Merrill, supra note 10, at 1129.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1132.
138. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 667, 677 (1986) (noting that the statute of limitations in adverse
possession “shapes the primary conduct of private parties”).
139. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 1130–31.
140. Some scholars have argued that adverse possession does not take adequate account
of the social and environmental benefits of keeping land undeveloped. See Stake, supra note 127,
at 2435. Professor Merrill debunks this argument, noting that owners do not have to develop their
land, but merely keep up a minimum level of maintenance that signals to others an owner is
present. Merrill, supra note 10, at 1130–31.
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of land over passive neglect.141
These same policies justify the application of adverse possession to
orphan works. As described in Part II, supra, the repeated extension of the
copyright term, coupled with the demise of the renewal, registration, and
notice requirements, has freighted thousands of expressive works with
uncertain ownership status. Just as adverse possession extinguishes stale
claims that cloud title to land, it could expunge the rights of missing
copyright owners who are neither exploiting their works nor maintaining a
current registration that would allow others to find them. By stripping the
private entitlement from orphan works, the doctrine would help return
intellectual property to the market, encouraging libraries, museums, or
corporations that had been wary of an infringement suit to find new
audiences for the material. At the same time, adverse possession would
serve as a background threat that would induce authors to maintain an
active copyright registration and prevent their works from lapsing into
orphan status in the first place. Just as the doctrine should spur land
owners to be good stewards of their property, so too should it induce
copyright owners to maintain a public presence so that others might contact
them and obtain a license for their work.
In this way, adverse possession would promote the fundamental
purposes of copyright. In contrast with European copyright regimes, which
seek to vindicate an author’s intrinsic and subjective connection to his
creative expression,142 copyright law in the United States attempts to
promote the dissemination of knowledge by offering authors a carrot, in the
form of exclusive rights, to produce creative expression.143 Although the
entitlement vests in the author, the Constitution’s Copyright Clause
141. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Stegall, 703 S.E.2d 561, 576 (W. Va. 2010) (observing that the
doctrine “rewards the person who has made productive use of the land, it fulfills expectations
fostered by long use, and it conforms titles to actual use of the property”); STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 860 (listing, among other policies underlying adverse possession,
the argument that “those who will keep land productive by using it should be given
permanence”).
142. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and Useful Arts.’”); Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (1945) (quoting an 1841
speech before the House of Commons in which Thomas Macaulay said, “It is desirable that we
should have a supply of good books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are
liberally remunerated; and the least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of
copyright”).
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envisions the reading public as the ultimate beneficiary.144 It therefore
grants Congress authority to bestow copyright protection for only “limited
Times,” after which the work becomes free for all to publish, distribute,
copy, and display.145 As Professor Roberta Kwall has observed, the
Framers “were heavily influenced by the utilitarian goals of promoting
progress, safeguarding public access and protecting the public domain as
the mechanism assuring access to information and facts in expressive
works.”146 Indeed, she reads the “promoting progress” language, rather
than the “exclusive right” language, as the primary grant of authority in the
Copyright Clause.147
The seeming harshness of this proposal dissipates if one considers
that it would apply only to copyrighted works that have essentially been
abandoned by their owners. Adverse possession would not denude an
author of his entitlement any time another party infringed his copyright and
he failed to bring suit to enforce his rights within the three-year statute of
limitations.148 In that case, the author would lose only his in personam
right against the particular infringer.149 The doctrine would strip an owner
of his in rem right150 to the work only after a potential user met his burden
of showing, through the series of steps detailed in Part V.B infra, that the
copyright holder had all but abandoned his interest in the work.
So why not rely on the doctrine of abandonment?151 Courts have

144. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(embracing the idea that “ultimate public access is the overriding purpose of the constitutional
provision”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”).
145. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (“Upon the expiration of the copyright term, the
work falls into the public domain,” meaning that anyone may perform, display, make copies, or
distribute the work “without first having to get authorization from the copyright holder.”).
146. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1981 (2006).
147. Id. at 1984.
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for all
civil actions under the Copyright Act).
149. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in
News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 435 (2011) (defining an in personam right as one that is
“thought to operate against a specific individual or set of individuals”).
150. See id. (defining an in rem right as one that is “operational against the world at large”).
151. See Eduardo M. Penalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191,
196 (2010) (defining abandonment as the “legal judgment that an owner has successfully and
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recognized that copyright holders may abandon their entitlement, but to do
so they must engage in an overt act that broadcasts their intent to
relinquish their rights.152 Orphan works cannot be deemed abandoned
within the common law definition because their owner has faded into
obscurity without signaling his intent that others may use the work.153 In
this situation, adverse possession provides a superior means of erasing
vestigial entitlements that have no continuing value to their owners. At
the same time, it would restore the value of these works in the
marketplace, because they would be newly available to others who might
find commercial, artistic, or scholarly use for them—perhaps by including
them in a database or compilation of out-of-print works, as Google has
done with its digital library.154
Courts have already proven willing to extinguish the copyrights of
sleeping owners. Several federal courts have drawn an analogy to adverse
possession to repudiate claims by putative co-owners who return after a
long absence to assert rights in a work that another has made profitable.155
In Zuill v. Shanahan, for example, two composers who contributed to the
musical score for Hooked on Phonics sought a declaration that they shared
ownership of the copyright with the program’s creator and were each
entitled to a third of his profits.156 The Ninth Circuit rejected their claim,

unilaterally severed ties of ownership that previously bound her to an item of property,” and
noting that an abandoned chattel becomes “a res nullius, a thing owned by no one”).
152. Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir.
1951); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 375–76
(2010) (explaining the common law requirement that a party seeking to abandon property must
carry out “a voluntary act” memorializing his intent to surrender his rights).
153. See Matthew W. Turetzky, Applying Copyright Abandonment in the Digital Age,
2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. No. 019, ¶¶ 21–27 (acknowledging that abandonment is not easily
applied to orphan works because of its intent and overt act requirements, but proposing changes
to the doctrine that might make it suitable).
154. See Megan L. Bibb, Note, Applying Old Theories to New Problems: How Adverse
Possession Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Crisis, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 149, 173–74
(2009) (observing that many orphan works may have little value on their own, but that a
collection of many such works may have considerable value).
155. See Santa-Rosa v. Combo Records, 471 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[W]e cannot
think of a more plain and express repudiation of co-ownership than the fact that Combo openly,
and quite notoriously, sold Santa Rosa’s records without providing payment to him.”); Gaiman v.
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 654 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing the “close analogy to the doctrine of
adverse possession”); Tolliver v. McCants, No. 05 Civ. 10840 (JFK), 2009 WL 804114, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (drawing an analogy between adverse possession and the rule that “past
notice of an ownership dispute can bar all future copyright claims”).
156. Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1996).
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holding that the defendant had “expressly and repeatedly” denied their
ownership interest in the work, an act the court likened to the ouster of a
cotenant that “starts the adverse possession statute of limitations
running.”157 Because the composers failed to bring suit to clarify their
ownership within the three-year statute of limitations, waiting instead until
the program began to turn a profit, they lost any potential stake they had in
the work.158 In rejecting their claim, the court noted that their demand
reeked of opportunism:
It is inequitable to allow the putative co-owner to lie in the
weeds for years after his claim has been repudiated, while large
amounts of money are spent developing a market for the
copyrighted material, and then pounce on the prize after it has
been brought in by another’s effort.159
Importantly, the court in Zuill did not simply bar the composers from
bringing an infringement claim against the Hooked on Phonics creator. It
expunged their in rem right to the work, barring them from bringing a
claim not only against this particular defendant, but against any and all
future defendants as well.160 In so doing, the court recognized the
unfairness that results when copyright holders neglect their rights until a
co-owner has developed a market for the work.161 This same risk attends
orphan works. Almost by definition, the authors of orphan works fail to
grasp the value of their copyright. If another successfully exploits the
work, then he should not have his profits disrupted by a dormant owner
who asserts his rights after years of acquiescence—especially since the
subsequent user, and not the original copyright owner, recognized its
market potential.

157. Id. at 1370.
158. Id. at 1370–71.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1369 (“The putative co-owners . . . argue that the statute of limitations cuts off
the remedy, but not the right. . . . This argument fails . . . .”); see also Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d
51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We hold that plaintiffs claiming to be co-authors are time-barred three
years after accrual of their claim from seeking a declaration of copyright co-ownership rights and
any remedies that would flow from such a declaration.”).
161. Cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 427–28 (4th ed. 2010)
(describing the problem of so-called patent trolls “who let dormant patents lie fallow until they
can be raised to assert a claim to essential parts of a substantial business developed by someone
else,” and arguing that enforcement of the trolls’ patent rights with injunctive relief would allow
these speculators to extort excessive licensing fees).
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V. ADAPTING THE DOCTRINE
Adverse possession is in some ways an unnatural fit for copyright. It
is a doctrine rooted in long and uninterrupted possession of land, and
copyright is an intangible entitlement that is “incapable” of physical
possession.162 But as conceived in this Article, adverse possession is an
analogy—a phrase borrowed for its familiarity. Where both tangible and
intangible property are concerned, adverse possession expresses a policy
preference for unburdening property of surplus entitlements that obstruct its
productive use in the marketplace.163 If anything, this public policy
concern resonates with even more force in the intellectual property context,
because the copyright that vests in the author is not an end in itself, but a
means of benefitting the public by incentivizing the production of creative
expression.164 An overly literal reading of the doctrine should not eclipse
the compelling policy commonalities that justify the application of adverse
possession to copyright as well as to land.
While the policies underlying adverse possession translate readily
from the real to the intellectual property context, Congress would have to
adapt the black letter test before it could be applied to copyright.165 As
traditionally applied to land, the doctrine vests original title in a hostile
trespasser through the following two-step process: the trespasser acquires
rights in land by virtue of his long and exclusive possession, and his
possession ripens into good title once the statute of limitations has run and
the original owner is powerless to bring an action in ejectment.166 This
Article proposes replacing that sequence with another test focused not on
possession, but on the balance of the equities. If a party seeking to use a
copyrighted work (1) made reasonably diligent efforts to identify and
162. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05[C][1]
(rev. ed. 2011).
163. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 1128–30.
164. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is . . . intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.”).
165. See Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse Possession for Intellectual
Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts Between Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 327, 365 (2003) (“The nature of
intellectual property is such that almost any real property analogy will require modification.”).
166. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
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locate the copyright holder, (2) posted notice to a registry describing his
intended use, and (3) subsequently engaged in open and notorious use of
the work, the running of the statute of limitations would strip the copyright
holder of his property right and deposit the work into the public domain.
This test builds from the premise that a copyright holder should not lose his
entitlement unless, by all appearances, he has orphaned his work; each
prong aims to furnish notice on the owner that his right is in jeopardy. But
once all efforts to give notice have proven fruitless, equity and sound
public policy favor lifting the owner’s monopoly and emancipating the
work into the public domain. This test has precedent in cases adapting
adverse possession to chattel property,167 which have likewise shifted the
focus from possession to the balance of the equities. The following section
will explore one such case and propose additional tweaks for shaping the
doctrine to the particular contours of intellectual property.
A. O’Keeffe v. Snyder and the Adverse Possession of Chattels
O’Keeffe v. Snyder is the seminal case in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court retrofitted adverse possession to apply to chattel property,
and it provides a useful guidepost in extending the doctrine to copyright.168
The case concerned three small paintings stolen from the artist Georgia
O’Keeffe in 1946.169 O’Keeffe did not report the theft to police, advertise
it in industry publications, or take any steps to recover the work other than
spreading the word among friends in the New York art world.170 When the
paintings surfaced at a gallery thirty years later, O’Keeffe brought an action
in replevin against the putative owner; he riposted with a defense of
adverse possession.171
The court acknowledged that previous cases had recognized the
doctrine’s application to movable property, but it identified an “inherent
problem” in extrapolating the doctrine beyond its origins in the law of real
property.172 As the court observed, “Real estate is fixed and cannot be

167. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006) (analogizing copyright to “personal property,” at
least in the limited context of intestate succession); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (declaring that
“patents shall have the attributes of personal property”).
168. O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
169. Id. at 864.
170. Id. at 865–66.
171. Id. at 866.
172. Id. at 871.
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moved or concealed. The owner of real property knows or should know
where his property is located and reasonably can be expected to be aware of
open, notorious, visible, hostile, continuous acts of possession on it.”173
Unlike an owner ousted from land, an owner dispossessed of his chattel may
have no notice of the whereabouts of the missing object or the identity of the
thief, finder, or good-faith purchaser who may have acquired it.174 As the
O’Keeffe court noted, if jewelry is stolen in one county in New Jersey, “it is
unlikely that the owner would learn that someone is openly wearing that
jewelry in another county or even in the same municipality.”175
The court in O’Keeffe needed a test to resolve the disputed ownership
of the three paintings, but it rejected a test focused on the defendant’s long
possession.176 Because the defendant and his predecessors in interest held
the paintings in a private home for nearly thirty years, their long possession
was unlikely to alert O’Keeffe of her rights.177 Instead, the court adopted a
test focused on the balance of the equities.178 It held that the statute of
limitations would toll where the bereaved owner exercised reasonable
diligence in tracking down his missing goods, as by notifying law
enforcement of the theft or loss.179 If the injured party put forward such an
effort, his cause of action for replevin would not accrue until he either
discovered or should have discovered facts that would enable him to
initiate the suit, such as the location of the item and the identity of the
wrongful possessor.180 The court characterized this “discovery rule” as “a
vehicle for transporting equitable considerations into the statute of
limitations for replevin.”181
The focus of the inquiry will . . . be . . . whether the owner has
acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her personal
property. . . . The rule permits an artist who uses reasonable

173. Id. at 873.
174. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 871.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 872.
177. Id. at 866.
178. Id. at 872.
179. See id. (“The rule permits an artist who uses reasonable efforts to report, investigate,
and recover a painting to preserve the rights of title and possession.”).
180. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869.
181. Id. at 872.
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efforts to report, investigate, and recover a painting to preserve
the rights of title and possession. . . . In determining whether the
discovery rule should apply, a court should identify, evaluate,
and weigh the equitable claims of all the parties.182
The court remanded O’Keeffe’s case for additional fact finding, but it
suggested that the equities did not tilt in her favor because she had failed to
take affirmative steps to recover the stolen paintings.183 If the lower court
barred her action for recovery, it would effectively vest good title in the
wrongful possessor.184
O’Keeffe holds several lessons for the importation of adverse
possession into the copyright regime. First, the case identified the central
difficulty of applying the doctrine to property that is not rooted in a single
location.185 Just as owners would have to search a potentially limitless
number of locations to track down their missing chattel, copyright holders
would incur excessive costs attempting to monitor every use of their
creative expression. It might well escape their notice that a library had
displayed their photographs among thousands of others in a digital archive;
a musician had performed their songs in an obscure nightclub; or an artist
had tessellated their images into a collage. This proposal acknowledges
that authors will not be able to prevent all instances of infringement, and it
does not impose a duty of perfect enforcement. Authors would not lose
their copyright any time another pirated their work and the statute of
limitations expired; in that case, they would lose only their in personam
right against the particular infringer.186 As the O’Keeffe court recognized,
adverse possession is not a defense “identical” to the running of the statute
of limitations.187 The doctrine operates only where an additional or
aggravating factor indicates that the entitlement should no longer remain
with the original owner. With land, that factor is the trespasser’s long

182. Id.
183. Id. at 866.
184. See id. at 874 (“History, reason, and common sense support the conclusion that the
expiration of the statute of limitations bars the remedy to recover possession and also vests title in
the possessor.”).
185. Id. at 871.
186. See Balganesh, supra note 149, at 435.
187. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that “the
defenses of adverse possession and expiration of the statute of limitations were identical” and
characterized the test instead as an amalgam of the statute of limitations and equitable
considerations. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
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possession.188 With chattels, it is equity.189
This Article, following the path charted by O’Keeffe, proposes a test
that would mimic the traditional doctrine of adverse possession by
brigading the statute of limitations with equitable and public policy
considerations. Where copyright is concerned, adverse possession should
come into play only where the author appears to have discarded his work,
not only ceasing to publish, display, or otherwise profit from it, but also
failing to leave any identifying information that would aid others seeking
permission to use it. A work needs dog tags if the author wishes to prevent
it from passing into the public domain.
B. Elements of the Adverse Possession Test
The following test strives to balance the equities between an absent
copyright holder and a party seeking to use his orphaned expression (“the
copier”). It would require the copier to (1) conduct a reasonably diligent
search for the author,190 (2) post notice in a registry indicating that the work
is believed to be orphaned, and (3) make open and notorious use of the
work for the duration of the statutory period. Each prong of the test serves
a notice-giving function. Taken together, the three elements strive to rouse
dormant copyright holders and protect them from the erroneous deprivation
of their rights.191 If the author takes notice of the unconsented use of his
work before the statute of limitations has run, then he may sue the copier
for infringement. The author would, however, be entitled to only limited or
nominal damages if the copier could demonstrate compliance with each
element of the three-part test.192 If instead the copyright holder fails to
188. Once the statute has run, the trespasser takes title because his long possession has
telegraphed to the rest of the world that he is the rightful owner. See Carol M. Rose, Possession
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 74 (1985) (“For the common law, possession or
‘occupancy’ is the origin of property.”).
189. See O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
190. “Reasonably diligent search” is the standard suggested by the register of copyrights.
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 60, at 8.
191. A test less protective of the interests of copyright owners could encourage predatory
behavior. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the
Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 723, 729 (1986) (noting that some
adverse possessors engage in bad faith rent-seeking activity, such as seeking out land that might
be “easy pickings” for a “successful expropriation”).
192. The register of copyrights suggested limiting damages to “reasonable
compensation,” which is to say “the amount the user would have paid to the owner had they
engaged in negotiations before the infringing use commenced.” REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
supra note 60, at 12. This Article suggests pegging damages even lower than the price resulting
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assert his rights before the end of the statutory period, then he would lose
his ownership interest and the work would pass into the public domain.
Essentially, the three-part test would serve to identify instances where a
copyright holder has truly orphaned his work, such that it would not be
inequitable to strip him of his title and free the work for use by others.
1. Reasonably Diligent Search
To distinguish his use of a copyrighted work from bare infringement,
a potential copier would have to conduct a reasonably diligent search to
locate the owner and request permission to reproduce, display, or otherwise
use the work.193 To satisfy this standard, a copier should review
registrations filed with the Copyright Office and search the records of
libraries, publishing companies, or private clearinghouses, such as the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers. If such efforts
prove fruitless, the copier could consult experts in the field who might be
able to identify the work and trace its provenance. Ultimately, the federal
courts would be charged with developing and fleshing out the “reasonably
diligent” standard through the lens of particular cases. In so doing, the
courts should tailor the stringency of their inquiry to the expected economic
value of the orphaned work. They should, in other words, demand a less
resource-intensive search in cases where the work in question has only
scholarly, as opposed to commercial, value. A more searching standard
could make permissions research prohibitively expensive for the libraries
or museums that are most likely to resurrect cultural artifacts that might
have value only to scholars.
2. Notice in a Registry
Before it imports adverse possession into the copyright statute,
Congress should establish a searchable registry where a would-be copier
could post notice that he planned to publish, display, or otherwise exploit
an orphaned work.194 Like the requirement that a copier conduct a
reasonably diligent search, the posting requirement would increase the
likelihood that a copyright holder would obtain actual notice that his rights
from a hypothetical negotiation, because the copier is likely to incur high search costs where the
work has little or no identifying information.
193. See id. at 98–108.
194. See O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872 (observing that “there does not appear to be a
reasonably available method for an owner of art to record the ownership or theft of paintings,”
and recommending the adoption of a registry).
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were in peril before the running of the statutory period. In updating the
registry, the copier should not only give a written description of the
orphaned work, but should also include digital images, audio clips, or other
excerpts that might help the copyright holder identify his work.
Lawmakers considered creating such a registry in one of the failed
bills addressing the orphan works crisis.195 The Copyright Office criticized
this proposal at the time, arguing that it would impose an “inappropriate
burden” on copiers “with large collections of orphan works,” such as
museums seeking to display thousands of historic photographs on an
external web site.196 However, this Article takes the view that inflicting
such a burden beats the alternative that museums and libraries have chosen:
mothballing the orphaned works rather than exposing themselves to the risk
of a lawsuit from a hibernating copyright holder.
3. Open and Notorious Use
Finally, the copier must engage in open and notorious use of the
orphaned work for the entirety of the statutory period. Like the other parts
of the test, this element is intended to alert missing authors that a copier is
encroaching on their rights so that they might seek relief before the statute
of limitations expires.197 Because its effect is likely to be incremental as
compared with the other prongs of the test, the “open and notorious”
standard should not be especially demanding. It would not require the
copier to engage in widespread dissemination of the orphaned work, but
merely to engage in something other than a purely private use. Such purely
private uses might include displaying a painting in the home or performing
a song for a small group of friends.
4. Passage into the Public Domain
As previously described, adverse possession extinguishes the original
owner’s title to land and creates original title in the trespasser; it does not
effect a transfer from one to the other.198 Because the entitlement does not
remain intact, Congress does not have to bestow the same exclusive rights
on the copier as it did on the original holder of the copyright. Once the
copier establishes all three elements of the test and the statute of limitations
195. Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. § 3 (2008).
196. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 60, at 113.
197. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 856.
198. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
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has run, the work would pass into the public domain, where the copier as
well as any other consumer would have the right to use it without fear of
liability.199 Where the original copyright holder has ceased both to exploit
the work and exclude others from using it, adverse possession would
become a means of accelerating its entry into the public domain.200
This proposal is fully consonant with the goals of the Copyright
Clause.201 Copyright law does not give an author all the spoils of his
creativity. It rewards his labor by granting him the exclusive right to
publish, distribute, and adapt his work, but it also sets an expiration date
after which the material becomes free for all to use.202 By liberating
creative works from private ownership after a period of years, the copyright
system fosters a robust public domain from which other authors may draw
inspiration without fear of treading on someone else’s copyright. Thus the
Sherlock Holmes stories, arguably free from copyright protection,203 have
given rise to a slick movie adaptation starring Robert Downey, Jr.; a BBC
miniseries set in modern-day London; and the television drama House,
M.D., featuring a doctor whose depression, drug dependency, and genius
for solving medical riddles call the fictional detective to mind. Originality
in the strong sense is rare indeed; every author alloys what is personal to
him with what he has read before.204 Even Shakespeare cribbed from the
ancient Greeks and the Italian commedia dell’arte.205 By establishing that
199. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
200. Under current law, works do not enter the public domain until seventy years after the
author’s death. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
201. It is also consistent with trademark law. See Strahilevitz, supra note 152, at 391
(“When a trademark falls into disuse, there is no longer any justification for impoverishing the
public domain, however slightly, so the mark is returned to the commons where it can be
appropriated by any other firm that wishes to use it in commerce.”).
202. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing Congress to grant copyright for only
“limited Times”).
203. See Jennifer Schuessler, Suit Says Sherlock Belongs to the Ages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2013, at C1 (noting lawsuit against Arthur Conan Doyle’s estate alleging that most Holmes
stories are in the public domain).
204. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissental) (“Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today,
likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows
by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before.”); see also Alex
Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 601, 601
(2012) (defining “dissental” as a colloquialism for a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
205. See generally Robert Henke, Transporting Tragicomedy: Shakespeare and the
Magical Pastoral of the Commedia dell’Arte, in EARLY MODERN TRAGICOMEDY 43 (Subha
Mukherji & Raphael Lyne eds., 2007).
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copyright should persist for only “limited Times,”206 the Constitution
recognizes the vital importance of maintaining—and building—a pool of
unprotected expression from which any artist may draw.207
This argument retains vitality even after Golan v. Holder, the recent
case in which the Supreme Court arguably downplayed the importance of a
robust supply of creative raw materials.208 Golan involved a challenge to a
statute in which Congress bestowed copyright protection on certain foreign
works—previously in the public domain—that would have been entitled to
such protection “had the United States maintained copyright relations” with
their home country at the time of their creation.209 Musicians, publishers,
and others who had built their business on free access to these works
claimed that Congress had transgressed the limited times provision in the
Copyright Clause by removing these works from the public domain.210 In
rejecting their challenge and holding that the public domain is not
“inviolate,”211 the Court reasoned that the Constitution vests Congress with
authority to calibrate the incentives best suited to encourage not only
production, but also dissemination, of creative works.212 In this case,
Congress made a rational judgment that improving copyright relations with
foreign governments would strengthen the market for American works
abroad.213 The decision affirmed that Congress has broad, if not
untrammeled, discretion to define the contours of intellectual property
rights, subject only to rational basis review by the courts.214 While
Congress exercised that discretion in this instance to enlarge copyright

206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
207. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 977 (1990)
(“Copyright commentary emphasizes that which is protected more than it discusses that which is
not. But a vigorous public domain is a crucial buttress to the copyright system; without the public
domain, it might be impossible to tolerate copyright at all.”).
208. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
209. Id. at 878.
210. Id. at 878, 884.
211. Id. at 878, 886.
212. Id. at 888–89.
213. Id. at 889.
214. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (“Given the authority we hold Congress has, we will
not second-guess the political choice Congress made between leaving the public domain
untouched and embracing [the Berne Convention] unstintingly.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 212 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the
Copyright Clause’s objectives.”).
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protection at the expense of the public domain, Golan suggests it would be
equally legitimate for Congress to use adverse possession to prune private
entitlements and free orphan works for use by the general public.
C. Future Developments
This proposal requires a brief addendum. The test described in the
preceding subsection could require libraries, museums, and private
companies to incur potentially high research costs en route to concluding a
work has been orphaned. If these institutions invest not only in research,
but also in shepherding potentially valuable orphan works back to the
marketplace, they face the risk that a competitor will free ride off their
efforts and begin publishing works that have gained a proven audience.
While these institutions should not obtain a full-fledged copyright in the
orphan works they rediscover—these are public domain materials, after
all—they perhaps deserve a circumscribed right that would apply against
direct competitors and protect the incentive to locate such works in the first
instance.215 As Professors Willam Landes and Richard Posner observed:
Often the demand for particular works of intellectual property is
unknown before they actually hit the market. . . . In the absence
of copyright protection, other publishers can wait and see which
author sells and then bring out their own version of his
works. . . . A complete solution would require that the
“resurrectors” of old works on which copyright had expired
without renewal, like finders in the law of real property, be
allowed to obtain copyright in those works.216
The scope of such a right is beyond the bounds of this Article, though it
perhaps might apply only to libraries, museums, or companies that serve
the public interest by creating online archives to make formerly obscure
works available to a broad audience.217
In any event, the creation of the right is premature. Even without
some type of quasi-copyright protection, Google plans to invest roughly
215. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–42 (1918) (recognizing
a newswire’s quasi-property right in unpublished news, good only against direct competitors).
216. Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 489; see also Netanel, supra note 37, at 370
(arguing that, to counteract free-rider problems, “the democratic approach might well support the
extension of limited copyright-like protection for those who ‘publish’ public domain works in
digital format”).
217. Cf. Bibb, supra note 154, at 177 (“The only entities capable of adverse possession of
orphan works should be nonprofit libraries and archives.”).
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$800 million in scanning current and out-of-print books to populate its
online library.218 While Google may have banked on earning a return on
this investment through its monopoly power—it has a unique product
because its competitors have not been willing to include copyrighted, as
well as public domain, works in similar online repositories219—the
proliferation of other digital archives suggests that some type of exclusive
right is not needed, at least yet, to incentivize their creation.220
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has impoverished the public domain by repeatedly
expanding the rights of intellectual property owners since 1976, no matter
what the collateral damage. Importing adverse possession into the statute
could help counteract that steady expansion and replenish the common
stock of unprotected expression. While Congress would have to amend the
elements of the common law test before it could be applied to intangible
property, the policies underlying adverse possession pertain as much to
copyright as they do to land. By paring back overbroad copyright
protection that has impeded, rather than promoted, the dissemination of
knowledge, adverse possession would serve the constitutional purpose of
promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”221

218. Toobin, supra note 78, at 33–34. Google has invested tremendous manpower in
bringing its library project to fruition. It designed and built high-resolution scanners capable of
handling millions of books, and it developed software that allows the public to reconnoiter their
text in a way no library catalog ever has. This software was more than a simple extension of
Google’s existing search function. As one of its engineers explained to the journalist Jeffrey
Toobin, “The real challenge is to get somebody something they are actually interested in, inside a
book. Web sites are part of a network, and that’s a significant part of how we rank sites in our
search—how much other sites refer to the others. Books are not part of a network. There is a
huge research challenge, to understand the relationship between books.” Id.
219. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679, 682–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
220. See, e.g., Daniel J. Wakin, Free Trove of Music Scores on Web Hits Sensitive
Copyright Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at A1 (describing an online archive with 85,000
classical music scores created by a conservatory student with help from volunteer labor); cf.
David Streitfeld, In a Flood Tide of Digital Data, an Ark Full of Books and Film, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2012, at A1 (chronicling the efforts of Brewster Kahle, a billionaire Silicon Valley
entrepreneur, founder of the Internet Archive, and modern-day Carnegie, to collect and store hard
copies of hundreds of thousands of books, many of which have been digitized).
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

